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CASE NOTES
tion of married women."34 It may, therefore, be more profitable to state the
dividing line between federal and state law not so much in terms of a
vague "overriding federal interest" but rather in terms of the localized
penetration and relevance of the federal activity. If, after the local character
of the governmental function has been established, it is then decided that the
application of the state law will cause substantial commercial inconvenience
to the government agency and will impair an important federal policy, the
federal interest may be called overriding.
RAINER M. KOHLER
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act, Section 2 First—Employer's Duty to
Bargain Decision to Lease.—United Industrial Workers v. Board of
Trustees of Galveston Wharves.i—Galveston Wharves owned and operated
the dock facilities of the Port of Galveston, Texas, including a public grain
elevator. The employees at the grain elevator were covered by a collective
bargaining contract which their union and Galveston Wharves had executed
on October 1, 1960. It provided, in part, that employees be given seven days
notice before being laid off and also contained a broad management-preroga-
tives clause. The contract was dated to expire on September 30, 1963, but
the parties subsequently extended its effective date to September 30, 1964.
Some time before the expiration of the contract, Galveston Wharves leased
the grain elevator to a third party. On July 20, 1964, pursuant to contract
terms, the union served notice that it wished to open the agreement for
negotiation. On July 23, Galveston Wharves notified the union of the lease,
responded that it would not negotiate—presumably because of the lease—and
posted notice that, effective July 31, all elevator employees would be per-
manently laid off. On July 29, in accordance with Section 6 of the Railway
Labor Act,' the union served notice requesting negotiation on this matter.
Galveston Wharves replied that, under the circumstances, such negotiations
were impossible. On July 31, the union struck and also instituted an action
against Galveston Wharves under the RLA for an injunction prohibiting
consummation of the lease and restoring the status quo until RLA machinery 3
had been exhausted. Galveston Wharves claimed that its actions were justified
under the lay-off and management-prerogatives clauses. The trial court ac-
cepted this argument and found for the carrier. Reversing 2-1, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit HELD: Galveston Wharves had to bargain
with the union over its decision to lease the elevator. 4
34 Id. at 349.
1 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
3 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 157 (1964).
4 Supra note 1, at 184. The interchangeability of Railway Labor Act major-minor
questions with mandatory bargaining questions under the Labor Management Relations
Act has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), cited in Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964).
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The court relied primarily on Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB'
It distinguished NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co.6
 on the ground that Galveston
Wharves did not terminate its business.
In Fibreboard, the Supreme Court held that "the replacement of em-
ployees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent con-
tractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment—is a
statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d).” 7 This case has
received two interpretations.
The National Labor Relations Board has maintained, even before Fibre-
board, that "the elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a
matter within the statutory phrase 'other terms and conditions of employ-
ment' and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. . . ."6 This
approach to the section 8(a) (5) 4
 problem has continued with the added
impetus of Fibreboard. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1° perhaps the most
prominent Board decision in this area since Fibreboard, the Board indicated
that it was orienting its thought toward whether the decision by management
had a "significant impact on unit employees' job interests. 711
The practical effect of the theory is not nearly as overpowering as it
sounds. This requirement affects only the bargaining of the decision and does
not demand capitulation by the employer nor alter his eventual right to
proceed with his plans. As the Court in Fibreboard said, citing to the language
of the court of appeals decision, "it is not necessary that it be likely or
probable that the union will yield or supply a feasible solution but rather
that the union be afforded an opportunity to meet management's legitimate
complaints. . . ." 12
 Nor was the Court unaware of the possible futility of
this requirement, but "national labor policy is founded upon the Congressional
determination that the chances are good enough to warrant subjecting such
issues to the process of collective negotiation."" Consequently, even a broad
reading of Fibreboard may be nothing more than an evanescent mandate.
The interpretation given Fibreboard by the Board has not been adopted
by the federal courts of appeals. In the first three cases 14 decided by the
courts of appeals on this issue since Fibreboard, the decision has been
restrictively read. In all three, two basic points have been raised to dis-
tinguish Fibreboard. First, the majority in Fibreboard specifically limited its
decision to those facts;" and second, in Fibreboard, the economics of the
6 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
6 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
7 379 U.S. at 215.
8 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1963).
9 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 	 158(a) (5) (1964).
10 58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965).
11 Id. at 1258.
12 379 U.S. at 214.
13 Ibid.
14 NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965) ; NLRB
v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963).
16 379 U.S. at 215.
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decision to subcontract did not amount to a great change in the capital
structure of the company.
The courts, therefore, seem to have taken literally the Supreme Court's
statement that it was limiting its decision. They view Fibreboard as a narrow
exception to the general rule that management has a unilateral right to change
the economic structure of a company. The NLRB, on the other hand, inter-
prets Fibreboard as establishing the rule that any management decision, albeit
one that concerns economic organization, is bargainable if jobs will be affected
in the change-over.
The problem which the present court faced, however, was not as simple
as whether Fibreboard required bargaining the decision to lease. It was
complicated by Darlington, where the Supreme Court stated that "so far
as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right
to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases. . . ."18
The fifth footnote of the Darlington decision, in which the Court said
"no argument is made that § 8(a) (5) requires an employer to bargain con-
cerning a purely business decision to terminate his enterprise," 17 has become
crucial from the Board's point of view; for on this basis, it has declined to
broaden Darlington to apply to section 8(a) (5) cases. In the Board's re-
hearing of Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,' 8
 it was faced with the specific
question of whether the Supreme Court decision in Darlington affected its
earlier holding that an economically motivated decision to close down one's
business partially must be bargained. The Board held that Darlington in no
way changed its decision because it was limited to section 8(a) (3) violations
and Royal Plating involved an alleged section 8(a) (5) violation." Similarly,
in Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 2° the Trial Examiner, in an opinion
adopted by the Board, said that "in Darlington the Court was concerned
with an issue of discriminatory motivation and its application, if any, to a
complete or partial closing of a plant. The charge in the instant case, however,
relates solely to Respondent's statutory duty to bargain." 2'
At least one court has taken the opposite position. In NLRB v. William
J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc.,22
 the court, referring to its finding of
no anti-union motive and citing to Darlington, stated that, "while such finding
was made in dealing with a charged § 8(a) (3) violation, the finding as to
motive equally applies to the facts relevant to the § 8(a) (5) violation." 28
The court went on to hold that a decision to terminate one division of the
agency need not be bargained. The dissent in Galveston, speaking more
emphatically, stated that Darlington "removes cessation of business questions
from the realm of mandatory bargaining" 24
 and that "Darlington holds that
le NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 6, at 268.
17 Id. at 267 n.5.
18 59 L.R.R.M. 1141, enforcement denied, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
13 Id. at 1142.
20 60 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1965).
21 Id. at 1366.
22 Supra note 14.
23 Id. at 902; see concurring opinion of member Jenkins in Royal Plating & Polishing
Co., supra note 18, at 1143.
24 Supra note 1, at 193.
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an employer has the right to close a part of its business so long as there
is no showing that the closing was for anti-union purposes." 25
Obviously, therefore, the court in the present case could have resolved
the issue either way. Under the Board's interpretation of the Darlington and
Fibreboard cases, the court in Galveston was clearly justified in its holding;
for the decision to lease did have a "significant impact" on the employees in
the bargaining unit. 2° Furthermore, Darlington does not apply where the
issue is whether management's decision must be bargained. On the other
hand, under the court of appeals view of Fibreboard, the present decision
to lease need not have been bargained. The facts in Galveston were different
from those in Fibreboard. The lease effected a change in the structure of the
company; for the grain elevator, previously an operating facility run by
Galveston, became a piece of leased property. Also, the new employees were
responsible for their work only to the lessee, while in Fibreboard the new
employees were still ultimately responsible to the same employer. Similarly,
under the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Darlington, it is arguable that
the lease constituted a termination of a phase of Galveston Wharves' business
and therefore did not have to be bargained.
LOUIS PASHMAN
25 Ibid.
26 Compare United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir.
1959) (pre-Fibreboard lease case), with Blue Cab Co., 61 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1965) (post-
Fibreboard fact situation which arguably involved a lease); see id. at 1087 n.5.
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